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Although trust and reciprocity are ubiquitous in social exchange, their neurobiological
substrate remains largely unknown. Here, we investigated the effect of damage to
the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC)—a brain region critical for valuing social
information—on individuals’ decisions in a trust game and in a risk game. In the trust
game, one player, the investor, is endowed with a sum of money, which she can keep
or invest. The amount she decides to invest is tripled and sent to the other player,
the trustee, who then decides what fraction to return to the investor. In separate runs,
ten patients with focal bilateral damage to the vmPFC and control participants made
decision while playing in the role of either investor or trustee with different anonymous
counterparts in each run. A risk game was also included in which the investor faced
exactly the same decisions as in the trust game, but a random device (i.e., a computer),
not another player, determined the final payoffs. Results showed that vmPFC patients’
investments were not modulated by the type of opponent player (e.g., human vs.
computer) present in the environment. Thus, vmPFC patients showed comparable risk-
taking preferences both in social (trust game) and nonsocial (risk game) contexts. In stark
contrast, control participants were less willing to take risk and invest when they believed
that they were interacting with people than a computer. Furthermore, when acted as
trustee, vmPFC patients made lower back transfers toward investors, thereby showing
less reciprocity behavior. Taken together, these results indicate that social valuation and
emotion subserved by vmPFC have a critical role in trusting and reciprocity decisions.
The present findings support the hypothesis that vmPFC damage may impair affective
systems specifically designed for mediating social transaction with other individuals.
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INTRODUCTION
Trust is an essential ingredient of human exchange (Arrow, 1974);
it lubricates social and economic transactions, and has been
long recognized as a critical antecedent of cooperative behav-
ior (Ostrom and Walker, 2003). Trust can be defined as one’s
willingness to place resources at disposal of another party in
situations in which there is uncertainty regarding the other party’s
motive, intentions and actions (Mayer et al., 1995; Rousseau et al.,
1998). An action that is trusting of another is one that creates the
possibility of mutual benefit, if the other person is cooperative. Yet
trusting behaviors also imply the risk of injury or loss to oneself
if the other person defects. Overriding aversion to such risks is
required for trust to emerge (Kosfeld et al., 2005).
Although theoretical work has identified a number of factors
likely to influence trust (Mayer et al., 1995; Lewicki and Wiethoff,
2000), fundamental questions remain about how trust actually
operates. For instance, while a commonly held view suggests
that trust is a result of rational calculation and higher cognitive
processes (Coleman, 1990), in some accounts trust is held to
be founded in emotional processes (Hardin, 2002; Butler et al.,
2003). Consistent with this latter account, behavioral studies
suggest that incidental emotions significantly influence social
exchange and trust (Dunn and Schweitzer, 2005). Moreover,
several neuroimaging studies have shown that tasks that require
social valuation (Winston et al., 2002; Somerville et al., 2006),
or cooperation with another individual (McCabe et al., 2001;
Gallagher et al., 2002; Rilling et al., 2002, 2004; Tomlin et al., 2006)
activate brain regions known to process emotions, including
the anterior cingulate cortex and adjacent medial frontal cortex.
Importantly, when subjects interact with partners they know to
be just computers, these activations are not seen, suggesting that
they reflect the interpersonal nature of the task (McCabe et al.,
2001; Rilling et al., 2004; Tomlin et al., 2006; van den Bos et al.,
2007). Neuroimaging studies, however, do not settle whether a
given brain region is necessary for a particular behavior. This issue
could be addressed by studying human subjects with focal brain
damage. Remarkably, however, only few studies provided causal
evidence linking brain areas integral to emotional processes to
trusting behavior (van Honk et al., 2012).
Here, we examined whether emotions, specifically social
emotions subserved by the ventromedial prefrontal cortex
(vmPFC), affect people’s willingness to trust others. Several
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evidence suggests this possibility. First, the vmPFC is densely
interconnected with basolateral amygdala, ventral striatum,
and subcortical structures that control autonomic and visceral
responses (Carmichael and Price, 1995; Haber et al., 2006), and
is therefore ideally located for generating emotional responses,
and guiding social interactions. Second, neuroimaging studies
in humans have implicated the vmPFC in guiding behavioral
choice under uncertainty (Hsu et al., 2005; De Martino et al.,
2006), and have argued that this region is critical for balancing
potential gains against losses to ensure optimal decision-making
in social context (De Quervain et al., 2004). Finally, damage to
the vmPFC in humans can be associated with strikingly poor
judgment and decision-making (Eslinger and Damasio, 1985;
Bechara et al., 1994, 1997; Koenigs et al., 2007), due to markedly
reduced (Ciaramelli et al., 2007; Koenigs et al., 2007; Krajbich
et al., 2009; Moretto et al., 2009), or poorly regulated (Koenigs
and Tranel, 2007) emotions.
To address whether the vmPFC plays a necessary role in the
decision to trust a stranger, a sample of patients with adult-onset
vmPFC lesions, as well as healthy control subjects (HC) and
patients with lesions outside the frontal lobe (non-FC patients),
played in the role of investor in a one-round trust/investment
game (Berg et al., 1995). This game involves real monetary
exchanges between two anonymous individuals, the investor
and the trustee, who receive each a sum of money from the
experimenter. The investor can keep all the money or decide to
invest some amount, which is tripled by the experimenter and
sent to the trustee. Next, the trustee decides how much of the
tripled amount to return. Money sent by the investor is used to
measure her trust, while money returned by the trustee is used to
measure her trustworthiness.
Clearly, the decision to trust entails a risk (Rousseau et al.,
1998). Uncertainty regarding whether the trustee intends to and
will honor the investor’s trust is the source of risk. This raises the
important concern over whether a person’s attitude toward gen-
eral risk influences trust (Eckel and Wilson, 2004; Karlan, 2005;
Schechter, 2007). To control for between-group differences in risk
attitudes, we therefore also implemented a risk game offering the
same options and payoffs as the trust game, but in which a ran-
dom device (e.g., a computer), not a human partner, determined
the investor’s risk. The risk game constitutes a critical control
condition because recent behavioral (Bohnet and Zeckhauser,
2004; Hong and Bohnet, 2007; Bohnet et al., 2008; Houser et al.,
2009) and neurobiological (Kosfeld et al., 2005; Baumgartner
et al., 2008) evidence strongly indicates that the decision to trust
is not only determined by risk aversion (i.e., the negative emotion
associated with the possibility of losing objects or money) but also
by betrayal aversion, that is, the fear to be betrayed by another
in social exchange. Betrayal aversion plays no role in the risk
game, since random devices are incapable of intentionality or
awareness, and they cannot really betray our trust. Therefore,
the contrast between trust game and risk game is ideal to assess
whether vmPFC damage specifically affects trusting behavior in
social exchanges (rather than risk-taking behavior in general),
because—except for the type of opponent partner (human vs.
computerized partner)—everything else remains constant across
these two games. Based on previous findings showing that regions
in the vmPFC may be critical for valuing social information
(Amodio and Frith, 2006), particularly when the implications of
another individual’s intentions must be taken into account before
acting (Rudebeck et al., 2008; Behrens et al., 2009; Moretti et al.,
2009; Ciaramelli et al., 2013), we hypothesized that investors in
the vmPFC-lesioned group would show higher money transfers
than those in the control groups, especially in the trust game in
which both social and non-social risks operate to inhibit trust.
Several researchers (Andreoni and Miller, 2002; Cox, 2004)
have argued that measures of trust taken from the trust game do
not discriminate between actions motivated by trust and actions
motivated by altruism or generosity. To address this question, we
measured the amount of money participants returned when they
played the role of trustee in a separate session. If lesion to the
vmPFC increases generosity rather than trusting behavior, then
one might hypothesize that a player will send more as investor
and return more as trustee, thus appearing both more trusting
and trustworthy.
Finally, we included a measure of the investor’s subjective
expectation about the trustee’s back transfer at different invest-
ment levels. This in order to control whether vmPFC patients
apparently trust more because they are more optimistic about
the trustee’s trustworthiness (e.g., they have higher expected back
transfers).
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Three groups of subjects participated in the study: (a) a group
of patients with focal lesions involving the vmPFC (the vmPFC
group, n = 10), (b) a control group of patients with damage
sparing the frontal cortex (the non-FC group, n = 10), and (c)
a control group of healthy subjects (the HC group, n = 10),
who were matched on age, education and sex with the vmPFC
group. Brain-damaged patients were recruited from the Centre for
Studies and Research in Cognitive Neuroscience in Cesena. They
were selected on the basis of the location of their lesion evident on
computerized tomography (CT) or magnetic resonance imaging
(MRI) scans.
Table 1 shows demographic and clinical data, as well as the
Mini-Mental Status Examination score (MMSE; Folstein et al.,
1983). There were no significant differences between vmPFC
Table 1 | Summary data for participants [mean (standard deviation)].
Group Sex (M/F) Age at test (year) Education (year) Time since lesion (year) Lesion volume (cc) MMSE
vmPFC (n = 10) 7/3 57.8 (6.6) 10.4 (4.5) 4.6 (2.8) 32.6 (19) 27.1 (2)
non-FC (n = 10) 7/3 54 (13.4) 10.3 (3.9) 3.8 (3.5) 26.5 (11.4) 26.3 (1.5)
HC (n = 10) 7/3 57.3 (7.3) 9.5 (4.2) – – 28 (1.8)
MMSE =Mini-Mental State Examination.
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patients and comparison groups with regard to age, education,
and clinical variables (p > .05 in all cases).
In the vmPFC group, lesions principally involved the vmPFC,
which is defined as the medial one-third of the orbital surface and
the ventral one-third of the medial surface of the frontal lobe,
following the boundaries laid out by Stuss and Levine (2002).
Lesion etiology was hemorrhage due to ruptured aneurysm of the
anterior communicating artery in 9 out of 10 vmPFC patients,
and to traumatic brain injury in one. The vmPFC damage was
bilateral (although often asymmetrically so) in six cases, right
unilateral in two cases, and left unilateral in two cases. All vmPFC
patients presented with clinical evidence of a decline in social
interpersonal conduct, impaired decision-making and emotional
functioning, but had generally intact intellectual abilities (see
Table 2).
The non-FC patients were selected on the basis of having
damage that did not involve the mesial orbital/vmPFC and frontal
pole, and also spared the amygdala in both hemispheres. In this
group, lesions were unilateral in nine patients (in the left hemi-
sphere in five cases, and in the right hemisphere in four cases)
and bilateral in one patient, and were caused by ischemic or hem-
orrhage stroke in nine cases, and by traumatic brain injury in one
case. In the non-FC group, lesion sites included the lateral aspect
of the temporal lobe in six patients, the lateral occipital area in
two patients, and the occipito-parietal junction in the remaining
two patients.
Normal participants were healthy volunteers who were not
taking psychoactive medication, and were free of current or past
psychiatric or neurological illness as determined by history.
All subject groups were administered a short neuropsycholog-
ical battery including tests with potential sensitivity to frontal
damage, as well as intelligence and memory tests (results are
provided in Table 2). The groups differed significantly only in
their performance on the Stroop task, with vmPFC subjects
making more errors than both non-FC patients and HCs (Mann–
Whitney U-test, p < .05). Patients were not receiving psychoactive
drugs at the time of testing, and had no other diagnosis likely
to affect cognition or interfere with participation in the study
(e.g., significant psychiatric disease, alcohol misuse, history of
cerebrovascular disease, focal neurological examination). Neu-
ropsychological and experimental studies were all conducted in
the chronic phase of recovery, more than a year post-onset.
All lesions were acquired in adulthood. Patients gave informed
consent to participate in the study according to the Declaration
of Helsinki (International Committee of Medical Journal Editors,
1991) and the Ethical Committee of the Department of Psychol-
ogy, University of Bologna.
LESION ANALYSIS
Lesion analysis was based on the most recent clinical CT or
MRI. The location and extent of each lesion were mapped by
using MRIcro software (Rorden and Brett, 2000). The lesions
were manually drawn by a neurologist with experience in image
analysis onto standard brain template from the Montreal Neu-
rological Institute (MNI), which is based on T1-weighted MRI
scans, normalized to Talairach space. This scan is distributed with
SPM99 and has become a popular template for normalization in
functional brain imaging. For superimposing of the individual
brain lesions, the same MRIcro software was used. Figure 1 shows
the extent and overlap of the brain lesions in the brain-damaged
patients. Brodmann’s areas (BA) affected in vmPFC group were
areas 10, 11, 12, 32 (subgenual portion), and 24, with region of
maximal overlap occurring in BA 10 and 11.
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND PROCEDURES
Every participant in the experiment played the role of investor
in two treatment conditions: a trust game and a risk game. In
the trust game, the subject played a standard trust game and
she knew her counterpart was human; we call this the human
interaction treatment. In the risk game, the subject knew her
counterpart was a computer making random decisions; we call
this the computer interaction treatment. Trust and risk games
were played in separate sessions with an interval of at least 1 week
between them. Half of the participants in each group played the
trust game in the first session, and half the risk game in the first
session.
All experiments took place in a quiet room in which an
opaque, removable partition wall was used to create two separate
settings. On either side of the wall, we placed a desk with a
computer. Participants sat at one desk in front of the computer,
while at the other desk sat either an actor who played in the role of
the trustee (trust game), or no one (risk game). As a result, playing
partners could be separated visually, thereby providing between-
subject anonymity, without separating them audibly, thus lending
our set-up credibility. Before each session, instructions about the
nature and rules of the game were presented on the computer,
and the experimenter verbalized them to ensure that participants
understood them. In the instructions, it was emphasized that
participants in the trust game would play the game anonymously
and only once with each opponent player, and that they would
receive the money earned in the game. Differently, in the risk
game it was emphasized that participants would play with a
computer counterpart. After reading the instructions, subjects
were required to complete a quiz that required them to state the
amount of money that each player would receive under various
Table 2 | Results of selected neuropsychological tests [mean (standard deviation)].
Group SRM Digit span forward Phonemic fluency Semantic fluency Corsi Stroop task errors ITS PNR
vmPFC 35.5 (13) 5 (0.8) 20.2 (9.3) 36.6 (14) 3.7 (0.2) 6.5 (7.3) 2.2 (0.5) 2.9 (1.5)
non-FC 30.6 (4.8) 4 (0.9) 28.2 (10) 42.8 (15) 4.2 (0.7) 1 (1.4) 1.9 (0.4) 2.9 (1.1)
HC 32.2 (3.4) 5.7 (1) 29.2 (9.2) 49.5 (18) 4.8 (0.7) 0 (0) 1.9 (0.4) 2.9 (1.2)
SRM = Standard Raven Matrices (scores in percentile values); ITS = Interpersonal Trust Scale; PNR = Personal norm of Reciprocity scale.
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FIGURE 1 | Location and overlap of brain lesions. The panel shows
the lesions of the 10 patients with vmPFC damage superimposed on
the same seven axial slices and on the mesial view of the standard
MNI brain. The level of the axial slices has been marked by white
horizontal lines on the mesial view of the brain. z-coordinates of
each axial slice are given. The color bar indicates the number of
overlapping lesions. In each axial slice, the left hemisphere is on the
left side.
hypothetical circumstances. The game started once the subject
successfully finished the quiz.
Subjects in the role of the investor received no feedback about
their partner’s decision between the different interactions. At the
end of each session, the experimenter put the cash payoff earned
by subject during the game into an opaque envelope that was
sealed and signed by the participant. Earnings envelops were kept
by the experimenter between games. Subjects did not receive
feedback about the outcome of any game until the end of the
experiment in order to avoid income effects and the possibility
that current decisions were influenced by an opponent’s previous
decisions. All games were paid out at the end.
Human interaction treatment
Participants acted as investor in a series of nine rounds of a trust
game against nine different anonymous human partners via a
computer interface. At the beginning of each round, the actor
that played the role of the trustee entered the room and sat at
her position. When both investor and trustee were ready, the
interaction started. Each round was presented as text through a
series of five screens. A 6-s initial screen depicted a silhouette of
a human figure and indicated the endowment (E) available for
both players in the current round. There were three equiprobable
initial E, e6, e9 and e12, presented in random order during the
game. The second screen posed the question “How many Euros
between 0 and E do you transfer to Participant B?” and remained
visible until a response was given. Participants were given the
opportunity to send any integer amount from zero to their
entire endowment available, and were instructed to indicate their
decision by pressing the numeric keys of the computer keyboard.
Following the response, a screen indicating the investor’s transfer
and the amount received by the trustee (three times the amount
invested) was presented for 4 s. Then, a variable 5- to 15-s waiting
screen informed that the trustee (Participant B) was deciding
how much of the tripled amount to send back. Subjects were
informed that Participant B could choose the amount from any
integer between zero and the tripled amount they have transferred
to her/him. Finally, a screen signaled the end of the round. The
trustee went out of the room and after a short break was replaced
by another actor to begin the next round. When the trustee was
out of the room, the investor was asked about her expectation
about the trustee’s back transfer.
Computer interaction treatment
Participants were instructed that they would play nine rounds
of a risk game in which a random mechanism determined the
outcome of the game. In the risk game, everything was identical to
the trust game, except that subjects played against a computerized
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partner. A silhouette of a computer was displayed in the initial
screen to indicate the computer interaction. Participants were
informed that, in each round, the computer would randomly
choose the amount to transfer back from any number between
zero and the tripled amount they have transferred to it.
In a separate session, participants played five rounds of a
trust game in the role of trustee against five different anonymous
investors via a computer interface. The experimental setup was as
before, except that participants were assigned the role of trustee
(Participant B), and an endowment of e9 was available for both
players in every round. Each new round began with a 6-s initial
screen that depicted a silhouette of a human figure and indicated
thate9 were available for both players in the current round. Then,
a variable 5- to 15-s waiting screen informed that the investor
(Participant A) was deciding how much between e0 and e9 to
transfer to the trustee (Participant B). Next, a screen indicating
the investor’s transfer and the amount received by the trustee
was presented for 4 s. The investor’s transfers, X, were prede-
termined and presented randomly, and included one transfer of
each e0, e3, e5, e7 and e9, so that the trustee received e0,
e9, e15, e21 and e27, respectively. Then, the question “How
many Euros between 0 and 3X do you transfer back to Participant
A?” appeared on the screen and remained visible until a response
was given. Participants were given the opportunity to send back
any integer amount from zero to the tripled amount received, and
were instructed to indicate their decision by pressing the numeric
keys of the computer keyboard. Following the response, a screen
signaled the end of the round. The trustee went out of the room
and after a short break was replaced by another actor to begin
the next round. Note that participants in all groups faced exactly
the same set of investors’ transfers. Thus, behavioral differences
across these three groups cannot be attributed to differences in
the distribution of investors’ transfers.
Questionnaires
Approximately 2 weeks after the experiment, participants also
completed three self-report questionnaires that assessed selected
personality traits. The Personal Norm of Reciprocity (PNR) scale
is a 27-item questionnaire measuring three dimensions (nine
items each) of reciprocity (i.e., the propensity to reward those
who have behaved nicely and punish those who behaved badly):
positive reciprocity, negative reciprocity, and beliefs in reciprocity
(Perugini et al., 2003); the Interpersonal Trust Scale (ITS) includes
25 component questions requiring subjects to express their trust
expectations across a variety of social situations and with diverse
social agents (Rotter, 1967).
RESULTS
Figure 2 illustrates investors’ average transfer as a function of
initial endowment, separately for the trust and risk game. We
performed a mixed design ANOVA on transfer amounts with
Group (vmPFC, non-FC, and HC) as a between-subjects factor,
and Treatment (human, and computer), and Endowment (e6,
e9, ande12) as within-subjects factors. When necessary, pairwise
comparisons were conducted using the Fisher LSD test, which is
considered the most powerful technique for post hoc tests involv-
ing three groups (Cardinal and Aitken, 2006). Analysis showed a
FIGURE 2 | Groups’ trust level, separately for trust game (upper panel)
and risk game (lower panel), and endowment. Error bars indicate the
SEM. vmPFC = ventromedial prefrontal cortex patients; non-FC = control
patients; HC = healthy controls.
significant main effect of Group, F(2, 27) = 9.62, p < .001, η2p =
.42, revealing that investors in the vmPFC group had overall sig-
nificantly higher transfer levels (e5.7 out of a mean endowment
of e9) than had investors in the HC (e4.3) and non-FC group
(e4.2; both ps < .001).There was also a significant main effect of
Treatment, F(1, 27) = 7.56, p < .01, η2p = .22, indicating slightly
higher transfers in the computer (e5) than in the human (e4.5)
interaction, and a significant main effect of Endowment, F(2, 54)
= 100.14, p < .001, η2p = .79, demonstrating that investors’ trans-
fer was modulated by initial endowment available.
More critically, analysis showed a significant Treatment by
Group interaction, F(2, 27) = 4.92, p < .02, η2p = .27, indicat-
ing that the between-group differences in amount sent depended
on the human vs. computer interaction. Pairwise comparisons
showed that when participants played against a human partner,
average transfer was significantly higher in the vmPFC group
(e5.8) than in both non-FC (e3.7) and HC group (e3.9; both
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FIGURE 3 | Group’s reciprocity level. Error bars indicate the SEM. vmPFC
= ventromedial prefrontal cortex patients; non-FC = control patients; HC =
healthy controls.
ps < .05), while transfers of the control groups did not differ (p
> .05). By contrast, when participants played against a computer-
ized partner, there was no significant difference between investors’
transfer across groups (vmPFC:e5.5; non-FC:e4.6, HC:e4.7; all
ps > .05). The identical pattern of results was found when the data
were analyzed using nonparametric methods. The Kruskal-Wallis
test showed a significant difference amongst the three groups in
the trust game (H = 12.8, df = 2, p < .002), but no difference
in the risk game (H = 4.78, df = 2, p = .09). Indeed, out of
10 subjects in each group, eight vmPFC patients showed mean
transfer levels higher than 50% of initial endowment in the trust
game, whereas only three non-FC patients, and fourHC displayed
such transfers in the trust game. Conversely, in the risk game, nine
vmPFC patients, seven non-FC patients, and seven HC displayed
mean transfers higher than 50% of initial amount.
The above results suggest that, while control participants
decreased their trust level when playing against a human part-
ner as compared to a non-human partner, vmPFC patients failed
to modulate their trust based on the recipient of their choices.
Thus, damage to vmPFC would lead to an apparent increase in
transfer levels in the trust experiment but not in the risk experi-
ment. Accordingly, investors’ transfers in the vmPFC group were
not modulated at all by the type of opponent player present in
the environment (e5.82 and e5.53, for the trust and risk game,
respectively, p > .05). In sharp contrast, both control participants
were more reluctant to invest in the trust game (e3.71 ande3.88,
for non-FC and HC group, respectively), in which interpersonal
interactions determines the risk, than in the risk game (e4.69 and
e4.74; p < .05, and p = .01, for non-FC and HC group, respec-
tively), in which a non-social, randommechanism constitutes the
risk. This latter result is highly consistent with previous literature
in healthy subjects (see De Quervain et al., 2004; Bohnet et al.,
2008; Aimone and Houser, 2009; Houser et al., 2009) suggesting
that the prospect for betrayal plays a role in trusting decisions well
beyond aversion towards monetary loss.
Next, we performed an analysis to explore whether vmPFC
patients differed from control groups in their subjective expec-
tations about trustee back transfers in the trust game. To this
end, a mixed design ANOVA, with Group (vmPFC, non-FC,
and HC) as a between-subjects factor, and Endowment (e6, e9,
and e12) as a within-subjects factor, was conducted on expected
back transfers divided by the amount sent (a value > 1 indicates
expected gain, whereas a value < 1 indicates expected loss from
the exchange). Results revealed a significant main effect of Endow-
ment, F(2, 54)= 6.70, p < .003, η2p = .20. More importantly, how-
ever, there was no main effect of Group (F = 1.42, p = .26), nor
any interaction between Group and Endowment (F = 1.25, p =
.30), revealing that the three groups of participants believed to
obtain on average the same return for their money transferred as
investor. Thus, results suggest that the apparent increase in trust-
ing behavior in vmPFC-damaged participants does not depend
on subjects’ beliefs about others’ trustworthiness, which was not
significantly altered.
We next tested whether trustees’ repayments to their investor
in the trust game differed across the three groups of participants
(Figure 3). A one-way ANOVA on trustees’ average back transfers
showed a marginally significant effect of Group, F(2, 27) = 3.20,
p = .06, η2p = .20. Pairwise comparisons revealed that vmPFC
trustees made significantly lower back transfers than HC trustees
(mean back transfer: e4.10 and e5.72, for the vmPFC and HC
group, respectively, p = .02). The non-FC group (mean back
transfer: e4.97) was not significantly different from the vmPFC
or HC groups (both ps > .05), possibly due to higher variance in
performance observed in this group. Thus, results indicate that
individuals with vmPFC damage do not show more trustworthy
or altruistic behavior than control groups.
PERSONALITY QUESTIONNAIRES
Table 2 shows self-report measures of impulsivity, trust, and reci-
procity for all three groups of subjects. There were no statistical
differences across the three experimental groups on ITS scores
(Kruskal-Wallis test, H = 4.07, df = 2, p = .09). Likewise, we
found no significant difference amongst the three groups in pos-
itive reciprocity scores (Kruskal-Wallis test, H = 2.09, df = 2, p
= .35), negative reciprocity scores (Kruskal-Wallis test, H = .83,
df = 2, p = .65), and beliefs of reciprocity scores (Kruskal-Wallis
test, H = .75, df = 2, p= .69) of the PNR scale.
DISCUSSION
We show that, following vmPFC damage, economic investments
are not modulated by the type of opponent player (e.g., human vs.
randommechanism) present in the environment. That is, patients
with lesions in the vmPFC showed comparable risk-taking pref-
erences both in social (trust game) and private (risk game) con-
texts. In stark contrast, control participants were less willing to
take risk and invest when they believed that they were interact-
ing with people than a computer (Bohnet and Zeckhauser, 2004).
Thus, vmPFC patients invested significantly more than control
subjects in the trust game, whilst no difference was observed in
the risk game.
These abnormal economic investments were not a gen-
eral effect of brain damage, because control patients’ behav-
ior was comparable to that of healthy individuals in the trust
game, but rather were caused by lesion in a specific prefrontal
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region vmPFC. Furthermore, the investment of vmPFC-damaged
patients in trustees cannot be simply attributed to difference in
intellectual, executive or memory abilities, because performance
at several neuropsychological tests was similar for vmPFC patients
and control participants.
Several mechanisms involved in trusting behavior might be
disrupted following damage of vmPFC. One possibility is that
vmPFC damage causes a general increase in altruism and proso-
cial inclinations. On this account, vmPFC damage should affect
not only the prosocial behavior of the investors but also that of the
trustees. However, the data concerning the trustees’ repayments to
their investors in the trust game failed to show more trustworthy
or altruistic behavior in the vmPFC group than control groups.
On the contrary, data showed reduced generosity in the trustees’
repayment in the vmPFC than in the control groups, thereby
indicating that effect of vmPFC damage on trust is not caused
by increased generosity or inclination to behave prosocially. This
finding is completely consistent with a recent neuropsychological
study (Krajbich et al., 2009) demonstrating that vmPFC damage
significantly reduces trustworthiness, possibly due to impaired
sense of guilt, a sociomoral emotion that plays a critical role also
in moral decisions (Ciaramelli et al., 2007; Koenigs et al., 2007;
Moretto et al., 2009).
Another possible mechanism behind the effect of vmPFC on
trust is that damage to this region alters patients’ subjective expec-
tations or beliefs about others’ trustworthiness or positive reci-
procity. In other words, lesion to the vmPFC may render patients
more optimistic about the probability of a good return from the
investment. However, results showed that these expectations do
not differ significantly between vmPFC and control groups, there-
fore ruling out the possibility that vmPFC patients show more
trusting behavior because of unusual or rose-colored beliefs about
other players’ repayments. Furthermore, also self-report measures
of trust (Rotter, 1967), and reciprocity (PNR, Perugini et al.,
2003), indicate that vmPFC patients and control groups hold sim-
ilar beliefs about others’ trustworthiness and reciprocity. That is,
when vmPFC subjects are involved in abstract questions concern-
ing their level of trust or reciprocity they are able to answer not
differently from controls groups. This finding is perfectly coher-
ent with results from several other studies (Koenigs et al., 2007;
Krajbich et al., 2009; Moretti et al., 2009) showing that an explicit
knowledge of social rules, as well as expectations and beliefs are
intact and normally accessible following vmPFC damage. Despite
this retained knowledge, however, vmPFC patients fail in valu-
ing social information in social interaction and decision-making
(Damasio, 1994).
As indicated at the outset, a critical finding of this study
emerges when comparingmean investors’ transfer in the trust and
the risk games across the three groups of participants. We found,
that following vmPFC damage, patients showed higher and simi-
lar investments in both games. That is, vmPFC patients did not
distinguish between interactions with an intentional agent and
those with a computer program that randomly generated out-
comes. In striking contrast, control participants were less likely
to invest when they believed that they were interacting with peo-
ple than a computer opponent (Bohnet and Zeckhauser, 2004;
Houser et al., 2009), revealing that normal economic decisions
are driven by factors beyond mere probability, and that “people
care not only about the payoff outcome but also about how the
outcome came to be” (Bohnet and Zeckhauser, 2004). Accord-
ingly, trust decisions, relative to risk decisions, entail additional
costs, costs shown to be above and beyond mere monetary losses,
which diverse authors (Bohnet and Zeckhauser, 2004; Bohnet
et al., 2008; Fehr, 2009; Houser et al., 2009) have explained as due
to betrayal aversion, namely, the fear to be exploited by others in
social interactions. Here, we suggest that, after vmPFC damage,
people lack such exploitation aversion, due to impaired social val-
uation (Amodio and Frith, 2006; Mitchell et al., 2006; Rudebeck
et al., 2006;Hare et al., 2010; Tricomi et al., 2010; Zaki et al., 2013),
which makes them more willing to take risk arising from inter-
personal exchanges. Concerns about “others” do not matter for
vmPFC patients, so that they perceive the decision of whether or
not to trust basically as a risky choice and decide based on their
expectations of trustworthiness and their propensity to risk. That
is, it does not matter whether the risk is constituted through the
uncertain behavior by the trustee, or through a random mech-
anism. In this sense, vmPFC patients behave more “rationally”
than control participants in our trust game: they only care about
their own payoffs and are hardly betrayal averse, as predicted by
the standard economic model.
Thus, the seemingly greater level of trust observed in vmPFC
patients could be related to their incapacity to value social infor-
mation and consider negative anticipatory emotional responses
related to trusting behavior, specifically they could fail to antic-
ipate in their decision process the value of negative emotional
responses associated with the risk of betrayal. Obviously, vmPFC
patients’ neglect of potential betrayal and increased willingness to
take social risk may invite exploitation and attract selfish actors,
which may explain, in part, why their social and financial invest-
ments are bound to fail.
A previous study of trust behavior in humans with vmPFC
damage failed to find significant difference in economic invest-
ment between vmPFC patients and control groups (Krajbich
et al., 2009). Several methodological differences may account for
the contrasting results between these studies. First, in our trust
game choices were continuous and quantitative (e.g., the investor
decides how much of her endowment to transfer to the trustee),
whereas, in Krajbich et al.’s (2009) study, investor had only binary
choices (e.g., trust vs. no trust). The binary-choice trust game
is easy to implement, but it is less sensitive and likely captures
less variation in investor’s trusting behavior. Second, economical
exchange with interacting partners was more realistic and salient
in the present than in previous study (e.g., their subjects were told
that their partners were in another city and were in contact with
the experimenter over the phone), which may have also enabled
us to find the reported effect. Third, our study involved a larger
vmPFC patient sample, which allowed us to reveal a significant
difference in trusting behavior after vmPFC damage.
Furthermore, our findings are completely in line with recent
evidence of increased rate of investment during a trust game, but
not during a risk game, in participants with selective basolateral
amygdala damage (van Honk et al., 2012), a region heavily inter-
connected with the vmPFC (Koolhaas et al., 1990; Bachevalier and
Loveland, 2006). The amygdala and vmPFC are thought to act
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closely together as a part of the neural circuitry regulating many
goal-directed behaviors (Murray and Izquierdo, 2007), thereby
allowing the selection of advantageous actions in the face of vari-
ous competing behavioral options. Interestingly, Bos et al. (2010)
found decreased trustworthiness in women after being admin-
istered testosterone, a hormone targeting on the amygdala. As
suggested by Johnson and Breedlove (2010), testosterone might
reduce interpersonal trust by acting on neurons in the amygdala
to increase communication to systems enabling fearful responses,
while reducing communication to orbitofrontal cortex, whereas
oxytocin might boost interpersonal trust (see Kosfeld et al., 2005),
acting on the same systems with opposite effects.
Thus, previous and current findings suggest that (basolateral)
amygdala and vmPFC are critically involved in social economic
decisions. Note, however, that several findings from animal stud-
ies (see Murray and Izquierdo, 2007, for a review) suggest that,
although amygdala and vmPFC functionally interact in mediat-
ing some types of adaptive choices, they make distinct contribu-
tions to emotional responses and reward processing. For example,
while the greater level of trust after basolateral amygdala dam-
age has been interpreted in terms of pathological altruism and
generosity (van Honk et al., 2012), the reduced trustworthiness
observed in current and previous study (Krajbich et al., 2009)
shows such a view to be untenable for vmPFC-lesioned patients.
Further research will be necessary to specify the nature of the
interaction between the vmPFC and amygdala and how dysfunc-
tions in this circuit differentially contribute to economic decisions
in a social context.
Altogether, the above evidence suggests that vmPFC patients,
as well as amygdala-lesioned patients, might lack of a mech-
anism of social vigilance, that is, they could be impaired in
the recruitment of social emotions that need to be antici-
pated correctly in order for decisions to be made optimally.
vmPFC, deemed as tuned to the evaluation of social informa-
tion (Amodio and Frith, 2006), might fail in the recollection of
past emotions related to a specific decision by upregulating the
value/consequences of future options based on the resulting affec-
tive states (Bechara, 2005). However, another mechanism that
might be impaired in vmPFC patients is prospection. Prospec-
tion refers to the ability to self-project in time (also referred to
as mental time travel) to pre-experience future events (Buck-
ner and Carroll, 2007). An impaired prospection might result
in myopic, impulsive behaviors. Shortsighted decision-making is
indeed a peculiar outcome of vmPFC disruption, resulting in
increased impulsive behavior during intertemporal choice (Sell-
itto et al., 2010, 2011) in increased willingness to judge as accept-
able personal violations (Ciaramelli et al., 2007; Moretto et al.,
2009; Ciaramelli and di Pellegrino, 2011); in reduced accep-
tance rate of unfair offers from a human partner (when mon-
etary gains were presented as abstract amounts to be received
later) (Moretti et al., 2009); in reduced interpersonal disgust (Cia-
ramelli et al., 2013). Indeed, the large investments of vmPFC
patients in the trust game can be considered shortsighted, impul-
sive decisions (see also van Honk et al., 2012, for a similar argu-
ment).
Taken together, the reported findings allow us to suggest that
a lesion in the vmPFC might impair the strategic planning and
anticipation of consequences of future events, by both disrupt-
ing the correct anticipation of emotions (social emotion, in the
current case) to assign them a value, and preventing the optimal
construction of possible scenarios following the choice.
In conclusion, these data showed that vmPFC has a critical
role in trusting decisions and, in general, is essential for the nor-
mal valuation of social stimuli during an economic exchange with
another person. These findings are highly compatible with current
theories maintaining that vmPFC is a critical neural substrate for
forecasting the (positive and negative) emotional consequences
of available options in order to guide future behavior, both in
personal and societal decision-making (Bechara and Damasio,
2005). Finally, the reported findings provide evidence for theo-
retical approaches to social cognition and decision-making that
emphasize the pivotal role of medial prefrontal cortex in the inte-
gration of multiple signals to generate adaptive behavior (Mon-
tague and Berns, 2002).
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